意思自治是商事仲裁的核心逻辑。具言之，有效的仲裁协议是仲裁机构对特定当事人之间的财产权益纠纷具有管辖权的必要前提。虽然理论上及域外司法实践已经认可了一定数量“仲裁协议效力扩张”的具体情形，但目前在中国司法实践中，得到制度层面认可的仅有《仲裁法解释》所规定的情形，而总分公司并不在其范围之内。

因此，对于仅有总公司或分公司一方主体有效签章的仲裁协议，倘若想以未在该仲裁协议上有效签章的另一方作为仲裁主体参与仲裁程序，无疑存在依据不足的障碍。但实务中，作为发起仲裁的申请人时常希望将未在合同上进行有效签章的总公司或分公司一并列为被申请人，以便实现其仲裁请求。本文拟以合同相对性视角分析此类仲裁策略在法理层面是否成立。

法理剖析

从概念出发，仲裁协议作为合同的子集之一，天然即具有“相对性”。依据《民法典》第四百六十五条第二款，依法成立的合同，仅对当事人具有法律约束力。合同相对性的理论基础来自于私法自治。而所谓私法自治，按照弗卢梅（Werner Flume）的经典定义，是指“各人依其意志自主形成法律关系的原则”。作为私法行为重要组成部分的合同行为，如果双方的约定可以径直约束非合同方，则无异于将平等性的债权异化为了命令、服从性质的公法行为。

对于希望仲裁协议在总分公司之间进行效力扩张的当事人而言，其往往认为此种扩张并不违反合同相对性，即分公司不具有独立的法人人格，总分公司实为同一民事主体。但此种观点实际上暗含了一个前提：“合同相对性”所指的合同当事人是实体法意义上的当事人，而非程序法意义上的当事人。如果将此前提倒置，则结论或将完全相反：因为在程序法意义上，分公司具有独立的民事诉讼能力，亦可独立作为民事诉讼的当事人。

不同视角

之所以不同的前提会推导出完全相反的结论，是因为根据现行法，分公司在实体法与程序法上具有着不同的法律地位。

在实体法上，根据《民法典》第七十四条及《公司法》第十四条的规定，分公司虽然不具备法人资格，但它可以自己的名义从事民事活动，产生的责任既可以其自身管理的财产来承担，也可由法人直接承担。

《民法典》关于分公司的规定在结构上属于第三章“法人”的第一节“一般规定”，并且根据《民法典》第一百零二条的规定，法律明确列举的非法人组织形式尚不包括法人分支机构。换言之，《民法典》并未通过明文规定直接认可分公司的民事主体地位，而仅将其与总公司的责任承担问题在“法人”的一般规定中进行阐明。

而在程序法上，《民事诉讼法》第五十一条第一款规定，公民、法人和其他组织可以作为民事诉讼的当事人。《民事诉讼法解释》第五十二条规定，民事诉讼法第五十一条规定的其他组织是指合法成立、有一定的组织机构和财产，但又不具备法人资格的组织，包括依法设立并领取营业执照的法人的分支机构。因此，在程序法的视角下，分公司在具备一定条件时完全可以作为民事诉讼的当事人。

结论

笔者认为，在仲裁案件中，以程序法视角理解合同相对性更为贴合原则本旨，即总、分公司彼此是独立的诉讼主体，一方的仲裁意思表示不必然约束另一方。理由在于：

第一，分公司虽不具备独立的法人地位，但并不意味着它不具备独立的意思表示。以目前的商业现实，独立经营、自主核算并且具备一定体量的分公司并不少见，其在具体商事交易中的诉求并不必然与总公司一样。因此，令具有独立意思表示的主体受到其他主体选择仲裁的意思表示的约束，未见合理。

第二，总分公司虽在民事责任承担的层面密切关联，但民事责任与民事主体地位仍然分属两个层面，不能完全混同。

第三，仲裁不同于诉讼。在诉讼中，存在着当事人与分公司签订合同，当事人起诉分公司，法院依职权追加总公司为共同被告的案例。但首先，这种情况即使在诉讼中也并不普遍，甚至原《担保法解释》第一百二十四条及央行的相关复函明文要求商业银行和保险公司的总行或总公司不应因分支机构的争议被列为被告。其次，仲裁主体的列明取决于仲裁协议的签字方的合意，不直接取决于仲裁庭的职权。

Comparing head office and branches on arbitration agreement validity

Autonomy of will is the core logic of commercial arbitration. In other words, a valid arbitration agreement is a necessary prerequisite for arbitration institutions to have jurisdiction over property disputes between specific parties.

Although some specific circumstances of “the expansion of the validity of an arbitration agreement” have been recognised in theory and judicial practice abroad, only those in the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court concerning Some Issues on Application of the Arbitration Law are currently recognised in China at institutional level, and expansion between head office and branch company does not fall within the scope of the interpretation.

Therefore, in arbitration agreements with only one valid signature or seal of the head office or branch, if the opposite party wanted to include the other non-signatory to the agreement as an arbitral party participant in proceedings, there would undoubtedly be insufficient evidence to support the party’s claim.

However, in practice, claimants initiating arbitration often wish to list the head office or branch, without a valid signature and seal on the contract, as respondent to carry out its claim in arbitration. This article analyses whether such an arbitration strategy is valid in terms of contract relativity.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Conceptually, as a subset of contracts, an arbitration agreement is of a “relativity” nature. According to article 465(2) of the Civil Code, a contract legally formed shall be legally binding only on the parties.

The theoretical basis of privity of contract comes from autonomy of private law. According to Werner Flume’s classic definition, autonomy of private law is “the principle that each person can form legal relations on his or her own volition”. In an agreement signed by two parties as an act of a contract, which is an important part of the conduct of private law, extending reach to directly bind a third party is no different from dissimilating the equal claim to a public act of command and obedience.

Parties who hope to expand the validity of an arbitration agreement between head office and branches tend to believe that such an expansion will not violate the relativity of a contract. In other words, branches do not have independent legal personalities, and the head office and branches are in fact the same civil entity. However, there is an implied premise in this view. Parties to a contract are parties in substantive law, not parties in procedural law.

However, if this premise is reversed, the conclusion may be completely the opposite. In procedural law, the branches have independent civil litigation capacity and can be independent parties to civil litigation.

CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE

The reason why different premises will lead to completely opposite conclusions is because the legal status of branches differs in substantive law and procedural law.

In substantive law, in accordance with article 74 of the Civil Code and article 14 of the Company Law, although a branch does not have the status of a legal person, it may engage in civil activities in its own name, and any liabilities arising may be borne by the property managed by the branch itself, or directly by the legal person.

According to article 102 of the Civil Code, the branch of a corporation is mentioned in the first section (General Rules) of chapter III (Legal Persons) in terms of structure and is not included in the list of unincorporated organisations. In other words, the code does not explicitly recognise the civil entity status of branches. Instead, it clarifies liability assumed by branches and head offices in the general rules on “legal persons”.

But in procedural law, article 51 of the Civil Procedure Law provides that citizens, legal persons and other organisations may be parties to civil proceedings. Article 52 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court concerning Some Issues on Application of the Civil Procedure Law stipulates: “For the purpose of article 51 of the Civil Procedure Law, other organisations shall refer to duly established organisations that have certain organisational structures and some assets, but are not qualified as legal persons, including … (5) Branches of duly established legal persons for which business licences have been collected pursuant to the law.”

Therefore, from the perspective of procedural law, a branch of a company can be a party to a civil action when certain conditions are met.

CONCLUSION

The author is of the opinion that in arbitration, an understanding of contract relativity from a procedural law perspective is more in line with the essence of the principle. That is, the head office and its branches are independent litigation subjects, and one party’s declaration of intent to arbitration does not necessarily bind the other party.

The reasons for this are, firstly, although a branch does not have an independent legal person status, it may have an independent declaration of intent. It is common to see branches with independent operations, self-accounting, and the claims of such branches are not necessarily the same in specific business transactions as those of head office. Therefore, it is unreasonable to make a subject of independent declaration of intent to be bound by that of another.

Secondly, although the head office and its branches are closely related to each other from the aspect of civil liability, civil liability and civil status are two different aspects and should not be confused.

Finally, arbitration is different from litigation. In litigation, there are cases where a party enters into a contract with its branch, the party files a lawsuit against the branch, and the court adds the head office as a co-defendant ex officio.

However, such a situation is not common, even in litigation. Article 124 of the former edition of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court concerning Some Issues on Application of the Guarantee Law, and relevant replies from the People’s Bank of China, expressly state that the head office of a commercial bank or insurance company shall not be listed as a defendant in a dispute concerning a branch. Also, the listing of parties to arbitration depends on agreement by signatories of the arbitration agreement, not on the power of the arbitral tribunal.

作者简介

梁恩泽，北京仲裁委员会/北京国际仲裁中心仲裁秘书。

本文刊载于《商法》2022年11月刊。如欲阅读电子版，欢迎浏览《商法》官网。